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With the end of the Cold War, and the predictability of bi- 
polar power arrangements, the shape of global security will be 
required to change to face the emerging threats of the future. 
Changes to the global environment, through pollution, 
unrestrained population growth, and over-exploitation of existing 
resources, will be among these future threats.  Regional security 
arrangements will be essential to controlling these threats, 
which know no territorial boundaries.  It is the threat of 
conflict over water, in areas of scarce supply and surging 
populations, that forms the framework of analysis for this paper. 
One area in particular, the Jordan River basin, on the western 
Arabian Peninsula, is one of the most arid, populated regions on 
earth.  Since the partitioning of the Arabian Peninsula, and the 
inclusion of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, this region has 
experienced conflict over water.  This paper examines the 
situation in the region in terms of historical conflict over 
water, past attempts to manage supplies on a regional basis, and 
possible solutions to mitigate the potential for future conflict. 
v 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. BACKGROUND        7 
A. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1915-1948  7 
B. RIVER BASIN FACTS 10 
C. RIPARIAN WATER USAGE 14 
1. Israel 14 
2. Jordan     15 
3. Syria 15 
4. Lebanon 16 
III. REGIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT 17 
A. 1939 TO 1967  17 
1. Ionedes Survey  17 
2. Lowdermilk-Hays Plans  18 
3. MacDonald Report  19 
4. Seven Year Plan  20 
5. Bunger Plan        21 
6. Unified Plan  21 
7. Johnston Plan  23 
8. Cotton Plan  24 
vii 
9. East Ghor Canal Stage I  25 
10. Israeli Ten Year Plan  25 
B. WATER WAR  26 
' 1. 1951 to 1956  27 
2. 1957 to 1967  33 
C. POST 1967 WATER DEVELOPMENT  38 
1. Maqarin Dam Plan  38 
2. Unity Dam Plan  39 
3. Peace Treaty of 1994 "... 39 
IV. STRATEGIC WATER  43 
A. THEORIES OF WATER AND CONFLICT  43 
1. Thomas Homer-Dixon  43 
2. Peter Gleick  44 
3. Thomas Naff  48 
B. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS  49 
V. DECREASING THE RISK OF CONFLICT  55 
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW  55 
B. ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS  56 
C. INCREASING WATER SUPPLIES  59 
1. Cloud Seeding  59 
Vlll 
2. Desalinization  60 
a. Med-Dead Project  62 
b. Red-Dead Project  64 
3. Water Importation  65 
a. Water Bags  65 
b. Water Pipelines  65 
D. CONSERVING EXISTING WATER SUPPLIES     .... 66 
1. Agricultural Innovations  66 
2. Wastewater Treatment  67 
VI. CONCLUSION  69 
APPENDIX  73 
LIST OF REFERENCES  81 




With the end of the Cold War, and the predictability of bi- 
polar power arrangements, the shape of global security will be 
required to change to face the emerging threats of the future. 
Changes to the global environment - through pollution, unre- 
strained population growth, and over-exploitation of existing 
resources - will be among these future threats.  The question 
then becomes: What shape will international security assume to 
fight these threats? 
Regional security arrangements may provide the answer to 
controlling these environmental threats, which do not recognize 
territorial boundaries.  One particular environmental problem 
that will need attention at the regional level is the threat of 
increasing competition for, and degradation of, regional water 
supplies.  In areas of the developing world that are dominated by 
arid landscapes and few alternative sources of fresh water, the 
concern over existing supplies has been magnified.  Since no 
country can hope to retain sovereignty, and/or increase develop- 
ment without ample amounts of this resource, it can often invoke 
strong emotional reactions from the state actors involved in the 
competition.  According to Thomas Naff, in his essay "Water 
Scarcity, Resource Management, and Conflict in the Middle East", 
"...the strategic reality of water is that under circumstances of 
scarcity, it becomes a highly symbolic, contagious, aggregated, 
intense, salient, complicated, zero-sum, power- and prestige- 
xi 
packed issue, highly prone to conflict and extremely difficult to 
resolve." 
It is the threat of conflict over water, in areas of scarce 
supply and surging populations, that forms the framework of 
analysis for this paper.  In the Middle East, growing popula- 
tions, burgeoning industries, and expanding agricultural bases 
are competing for the same water supply.  There are three major 
river systems in the region: the Tigris - Euphrates, the Nile, and 
the Jordan.  The states of each river system are experiencing in- 
creasing competition for water resources and the potential for 
conflict between their co-riparian states.  It is the competition 
over water in the Jordan River basin that is the subject of this 
thesis. 
The Jordan River basin, located in the western Arabian 
Peninsula, is one of the most arid, populated regions on earth. 
Since the partitioning of the Arabian Peninsula by the League of 
Nations following World War I and the inclusion of a Jewish home- 
land in Palestine, this region has experienced conflict over 
water.  The increasing competition for water between the four 
riparian states of the basin, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, 
has produced threats of future conflict.  In 1990 Jordanian King 
Hussein stated: "The only issue over which Jordan might go to war 
is the issue of water."  While the peace process has made much 
progress in the region in the past few years, all four riparian 
states have not come to agreement on the issue of water use and 
distribution.  Therefore, it is essential to be aware of the 
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factors that caused conflict in the past, historical attempts to 
manage water supplies on a regional basis, and possible solutions 
to mitigate the potential for future conflict. 
Theories that analyze the connections between water and con- 
flict point to simple resource scarcity and maldistribution as 
the main causes on conflict.  However, environmental issues 
cannot be de-linked from more political, and less resolvable 
issues, such as Palestinian independence, when analyzing the 
potential for conflict.  Regional agreements, and the interven- 
tion of international law can solve the problem of maldistributi- 
on.  The problems of resource scarcity can be .handled by under- 
standing the proper role of water as an economic resource, and 
pricing it so as to increase efficiency of use; and by increasing 
investment in methods of acquiring new water supplies, and 
conserving existing supplies.  However, these measures must be 
carried out in an integrated, regional fashion, with the full 
participation of all riparian states, and separate from the 




The end of the Cold War has left questions in the minds of 
International Relations theorists regarding the quality of the 
subsequent "peace".  In his essay, "Back to the Future, 
Instability in Europe after the Cold War," John Mearsheimer 
argues that the end of the bi-polar power arrangement, fostered 
by the Cold War, will lead to an increased chance of conflict in 
Europe.  According to Mearsheimer, "...bipolarity, an equal 
military balance, and nuclear weapons have fostered peace in 
Europe over the past 45 years.  The Cold War confrontation 
produced these phenomena; thus the Cold War was principally 
responsible for transforming a historically violent region into a 
very peaceful place." (Lynn-Jones, 1993, pp. 187) 
Stephen Van Evera, in "Primed for Peace, Europe after the 
Cold War", takes the opposing view from Mearsheimer.  Van Evera 
asserts that "the European wars of this century grew mainly from 
military factors and domestic conditions that are largely gone, 
and will not return in force." Therefore the shift from bi- 
polarity to multi-polarity will not increase the likelihood of 
war in Europe. (Lynn-Jones, 1993, pp. 195)  In a related article, 
"Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," Jack Snyder proposes three 
views of the future that the end of the Cold War will inspire: 
Liberal "end of history" optimism envisions that...the 
sources of conflicts in Europe will be eliminated and 
peace will break out.  Hobbesian pessimism anticipates 
a reversion to pre-1945 patterns of multi-polar 
instability and nationalism.... a third view that is 
conditionally optimistic: neo-liberal institutionalism 
prescribes the implantation of cooperative internation- 
al institutions as an antidote to the consequences of 
Hobbsian anarchy. (Lynn-Jones, 1993, pp. 104) 
While the International Relations theorists quoted above are 
concerned primarily with post-Cold War instability in Europe, the 
end of bi-polarity will most assuredly change the patterns of 
power in a global fashion.  As is evident by the dissention 
expressed by the "experts" the future arrangement of global 
security is unknown and possibly unstable.  The question then 
becomes: What shape will international security assume, and in 
regard to what future threats? 
With the end of bi-polarity and the ascension of multi- 
polarity, future security agreements may involve regional securi- 
ty.  Existing regional security arrangements have been based on 
such practical considerations as economics, for example the 
European Economic Community or North American Free Trade Associa- 
tion; and have included more emotional issues such as the ethnic 
based Amerindian recovery taking place in Latin America. (Jack- 
son, 1993, pp. 329)  However, one issue that few regional securi- 
ty arrangements are currently addressing is the threat brought 
about by environmental changes.  Such changes seldom affect only 
a single state and may often cross international boundaries. 
Therefore regional agreements will be necessary to mitigate the 
competition and/or conflict that may be produced by the efforts 
of sovereign states to control a perceived problem in ways most 
advantageous to their own national interests. 
Robert Kaplan, in his Atlantic Monthly article "The Coming 
Anarchy" states definitively how he views the threat posed by 
environmental change: 
It is time to understand "the environment" for what it 
is: tiie national-security issue of the early twenty- 
first century.  The political and strategic impact of 
surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation 
and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, 
possibly, rising sea levels in critical, overcrowded 
regions like the Nile Delta and Bangladesh—develop- 
ments that will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, 
incite group conflicts—will be the core foreign-policy 
challenge from which most others will ultimately ema- 
nate, arousing the public and uniting assorted interest 
left over from the Cold War. 
Kaplan's words bring about a series of fearful images of the 
anarchy that he sees encompassing a future world that refuses to 
come to grips with the importance of environmental change as a 
legitimate security issue. 
One of the most pressing environmental issues, as cited by 
Kaplan, is the issue of regional water supplies; in terms of 
increasing competition for and degradation of these supplies.  In 
areas of the developing world that are dominated by arid land- 
scapes and few alternative sources of fresh water the concern 
over existing supplies has been magnified.  Since no country can 
hope to retain sovereignty, and/or increase development without 
ample amounts of this resource, it can often invoke strong 
emotional reactions from the state actors involved in the compe- 
tition.  According to Thomas Naff, in his essay "Water Scarcity, 
Resource Management, and Conflict in the Middle East", "...the 
strategic reality of water is that under circumstances of scarci- 
ty, it becomes a highly symbolic, contagious, aggregated, in- 
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tense, salient, complicated, zero-sum, power- and prestige-packed 
issue, highly prone to conflict and extremely difficult to 
resolve." 
In the Middle East, growing populations, burgeoning indus- 
tries, and expanding agricultural bases are competing for the 
same water supply.  The three major river basins in the region 
are all facing increasing competition from their riparian states. 
The Tigris-Euphrates river system, which provides water to 
Turkey, Syria and Iraq, has been the subject of much debate, as 
Turkey the upstream riparian builds massive dams on the headwa- 
ters, severely restricting the flow to the two downstream states. 
The downstream states of the Nile river basin, Egypt and Sudan, 
are fearful of the consequences of riverine development in 
Ethiopia, as that would restrict and diminish their vital water 
supplies.  The competition for water in the Jordan River basin is 
also of concern to the co-riparians, and will be the subject of 
this paper. 
The Jordan River basin has less water than almost any 
populated region on earth.  It is the increasing competition for 
this water among its four riparian states, Syria, Lebanon, Israel 
and Jordan, that has in the past been the cause of conflict in 
the region, and has produced threats of future conflicts.  In 
1990 Jordanian King Hussein stated: "The only issue over which 
Jordan might go to war is the issue of water." (Hillel, 1994, pp. 
267)  Even in times of peace, competition over water could 
provide the spark to ignite renewed regional conflict if adequate 
attempts are not made to improve methods for the acquisition of new 
water supplies and the management of existing supplies. 
This paper will examine the water situation in the Jordan 
River basin beginning with a general background of the settlement 
of the area, Jordan River and ground water facts, and riparian 
water usage. Next there is a discussion of past and current 
attempts at water management and the conflicts that resulted from 
the region's inability to come to a unified consensus over water 
usage. The following chapter includes some of the theories 
concerning conflicts over water in general, and specific aspects of 
the possibility of conflict in the Jordan River basin. Chapter 
four discusses some of the ways in which water conflicts can be 
mitigated; including economic policies, and methods of acquiring 
additional supplies and conserving existing supplies. 

II. BACKGROUND 
A. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1915-1948 
During World War I, Britain made a series of "secret" 
promises and alliances that were not reconciled by postwar peace 
conferences.  First, during the last six months of 1915, a series 
of letters were exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon and the 
Sharif Husayn of Mecca that promised the Arabs independence if 
they would revolt against the Ottoman Turks.  Second, in November 
1917 the British issued the Balfour Declaration, pledging to 
support a Jewish national home in Palestine.  Third, the secret 
Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain, France, and Russia was 
drawn up, promising to divide the central Middle East between the 
three countries, with each power governing two areas.   Britain 
and France would dominate the central Middle East from the 
Mediterranean to the Gulf.  The "secret" Sykes-Picot- agreement 
was exposed by the Russians following the 1917 Revolution, and 
the Arabs were outraged by the apparent double dealing of the 
British.  Not only was Arab independence in jeopardy, but the 
Jews were to build a homeland on Arab soil. 
With the end of hostilities in 1918, an Occupied Enemies 
Territories Administration (OETA) was established to administer 
the Ottoman territories pending a peace agreement.  Delays in 
concluding a peace treaty, prompted Britain and France to convene 
the Supreme Council of the League of Nations.  The Supreme 
Council announced, at San Remo in 1920, a system of mandates by 
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which the occupied territories would be governed until a peace 
agreement could be worked out.  On behalf of the League of 
Nations, Britain and France took over the governance of the Arab 
lands of the former Ottoman Empire.   The mandates for Lebanon 
and Syria were given to France, but Damascus had to be taken by 
the French using force.  The mandates for the newly created 
Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq, were given to Britain.  Includ- 
ed in the terms for the mandate for Palestine, and endorsed by 
the Conference of San Remo, was the Balfour Declaration, allowing 
for the establishment of a Jewish national homeland in the area 
that was then known as Palestine.  "With this, British wartime 
promises to support Arab independence in areas liberated from 
Turkish control were irrevocably broken." (Drysdale, 1985, pp. 
63) 
The inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the treaty of 
San Remo opened up the area for the immigration of Jewish set- 
tlers and refugees of the First World War.  The influx of Jewish 
immigrants into the area was of immediate concern to the Arab 
community, and in an effort to ease the tensions the British 
government imposed quotas on Jewish immigration in 1922.  The 
attitude of the Jewish settlers was that, "in order to accumulate 
maximum territory, ever-increasing rates of immigration...were 
necessary, while extensive land purchases were perceived as 
essential for the absorption of both the ongoing immigration and 
the immigration the Zionist movement hoped for in the future." 
(Lowi, 1993, pp. 43)  The Arabs however were of a different mind, 
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and viewed the scenario as one of Jewish encroachment on Arab 
lands: tensions continued. 
In 1936 the British Colonial Office began to investigate the 
feasibility of dividing the area up into three parts: a Jewish 
state, an Arab state, and a British enclave.  However that 
proposal never came to light, and it was not until 29 November 
1947 the united Nations General Assembly voted in favor of 
another partition plan.  This plan would partition Palestine into 
a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an internationalized Jerusa- 
lem.  However, on 14 May 1948, one day before the planned British 
withdrawal from Palestine, Israel declared its sovereignty.  The 
first Arab-Israel War began the following day, when armies from 
the neighboring Arab countries attacked the newly independent 
Jewish state. (Lowi, 1993, pp. 47) 
By the end of the first war, Israel occupied 20 percent more 
land than had been allocated to it under the 1947 Partition Plan. 
Approximately 80 percent of the Arab population of the land that 
was now called Israel had fled or were expelled from the area. 
With regard to water resources, Israel gained the Dan Spring (one 
of the Jordan's headwaters), Lake Huleh, the Sea of Galilee, and 
part of the Dead Sea.  The Kingdom of Jordan gained about 450,000 
Palestinian refugees, and the dependance of some 400,000 Pales- 
tinians living on the West Bank.  In less than two years the 
population of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan trebled. 
Israel's population also grew rapidly with the declaration 
of sovereignty and the removal of immigration restrictions.  The 
initial population when sovereignty was declared, 700,000 Jews, 
doubled within the first four years of Israel's existence.  "The 
percentage of Jews in the total population of Palestine/Israel 
jumped from 30 percent in 1948 to 89 percent in 1951.  By 1952, 
about 684,000 new immigrants had arrived from Europe and the Arab 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa." (Lowi, 1993, pp. 
47)  Both Israel and Jordan needed to begin rapid development to 
support the additions to their population figures.  The Jordan 
River system figured high in their plans. 
B. RIVER BASIN FACTS 
The Jordan River basin is comprised of four riparian states, 
Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan.  This area of the Middle East 
has relatively little water, therefore competition is great and 
innovative water resource management has a high value.  The total 
water availability of the Jordan River basin is greatly limited. 
The annual discharge of the Jordan River is only 1.2 billion 
cubic meters; a fraction of the water provided by the Nile's 84 
billion cubic meter annual discharge. 
The Upper Jordan, above the Sea of Galilee (also called Lake 
Tiberias or Lake Kinneret), has three main sources: (1) the Dan 
spring, originating near Israel's northern border, which provides 
245 million cubic meters annually; (2) the Hasbani River, origi- 
nating in southeast Lebanon, which delivers a flow that varies 
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River, originating in the Golan Heights, which delivers 120 
million cubic meters annually. (Hiiiel, 1994, pp. 153) 
The three principal sources of the upper Jordan converge in 
Israel, flow through the Huleh Basin, and plunge into the Sea of 
Galilee.  The river that flows from the Sea of Galilee is re- 
ferred to as the lower Jordan.  The main tributary of the lower 
Jordan, the Yarmouk which flows from the east along the Syri- 
an/Jordanian border, enters the Jordan a few kilometers south of 
the Sea of Galilee.  The Yarmouk delivers approximately 475 
million cubic meters annually into the lower Jordan.  Farther to 
the south several other tributaries, including the Harod, Yabis, 
Faria, Zarqa and Nusayrat, join the lower Jordan.  These tribu- 
taries provide varied, small amounts of additional water to the 
lower Jordan.  From its starting point at the Sea of Galilee 
until it terminates in the Dead Sea, the lower Jordan flows 
approximately 100 kilometers. 
Another major source of water for the region is ground water 
contained in aquifers, or water-bearing rock formations.  Two 
important aquifers, located within Israel and the West Bank are 
the Coastal Plain Aquifer, running along the Mediterranean coast, 
and the Cenomanian-Turonian Aquifer, running under the mountains 
of Israel and West Bank straddling the Green Line (the 1949 
temporary cease fire line separating Israel from Jordan).  Both 
of these aquifers are considered renewable water resources.  This 
indicates that they may be replenished by rainfall and artificial 
recharge.  There are also aquifers in the region which are not 
12 
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renewable and therefore are permanently diminished through 
regional exploitation.  Ground water must be carefully managed 
because overuse can cause affects, such as seawater intrusion, 
which would decrease water quality and render it useless. 
(Drezon-Tepler, 1994, pp. 283) 
C. RIPARIAN WATER USAGE 
1. Israel 
Over exploitation of available water sources has left the 
state of Israel with a water deficit.  "According to a report by 
the State Comptroller in 1990, Israel's water deficit is princi- 
pally attributable not to years of drought but rather to uncon- 
trolled exploitation and mismanagement of resources and lack of 
institutional coordination." (Beschorner, 1992, pp. 10)  Israel's 
estimated renewable annual freshwater resources are approximately 
1600 million cubic meters.  In 1990 Israeli water consumption was 
estimated at 1750 million cubic meters, with 1162 million cubic 
meters going to agriculture, 106 million cubic meters for indus- 
trial purposes and 482 million cubic meters for domestic use 
(Beschorner, 1992, pp. 11). 
Approximately 380 million cubic meters of water are diverted 
annually from the Sea of Galilee into the country's National 
Water Carrier, to be distributed throughout the land.  Israel 
also uses approximately 100 million cubic meters annually from 
the Yarmouk River.  Ground water supplies 60 percent of Israel's 
needs, and sea-water intrusion into the coastal aquifer is now a 
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critical problem.  With the water table constantly dropping, and 
the salinity increasing, many wells have become useless for 
drinking water and irrigation. (Ploss, 1992, pp. 20) 
2. Jordan 
The annual water supply of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
is approximately 800 million cubic meters.  Of this total, 320 
million cubic meters come from surface water (130 from the 
Yarmouk, 120 from the Jordan, the remaining 70 from small rivers 
and streams); 270 million cubic meters are derived from renewable 
ground water, and 210 million cubic meters from non-renewable 
ground water.  Total Jordanian water consumption in 1990 was 743 
million cubic meters; 360 of surface water and 383 of ground 
water.  The water was allocated between the agricultural sector, 
520 million cubic meters, the industrial sector, 70 million cubic 
meters, and the domestic sector, 175 million cubic meters. 
Jordan's Disi aquifer is at risk of depletion due to ground water 
consumption by the Kingdom's neighbor, Saudi Arabia. (Beschorner, 
1992, pp. 16) 
3. Syria 
Syria is in control of the headwaters of the Yarmouk River; 
the source of much of Jordan's water.  In 1991 Syria consumed 153 
million cubic meters from the Yarmouk River.  Plans for increases 
in irrigation could boost that consumption rate to 200 million 
cubic meters, and is the cause of concern for Jordan as it would 
reduce the amount of water available for irrigation in the 
northern highlands.(Beschorner, 1992, pp. 17) 
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4. Lebanon 
The water supply of Lebanon is estimated at 4800 million 
cubic meters annually, garnered for the most part from 15 surface 
rivers.  The country's total water consumption in 1991 was esti- 
mated at 900 million cubic meters; with 185 million cubic meters 
for domestic use, 35 million cubic meters for industrial use, and 
670 million cubic meters for agricultural use.  With a predicted 
population increase of 1.6 million by the year 2000, consumption 
rates are expected to rise to 1700 million cubic meters annually; 
divided between the domestic, industrial and agricultural sectors 
at 450, 120, and 1120 million cubic meters respectively.  There 
is a great deal of Israeli interest in the possibility of water 
exportation from Lebanon.  A plan which Lebanon has shown no 
interest in promoting. (Beschorner, 1992, pp. 18) 
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III. REGIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT 
A. 1939 TO 1967 
Beginning in the 1930's there has been no end to the number 
of proposed plans for the management of the Jordan River basin.1 
Due to increasing competition for water, a result of the influx 
of migrants into the area after World War I, the various plans 
have attempted to alleviate the problems of water distribution, 
and therefore reduce tensions in the area.  These past plans in- 
clude: the Ionides Survey (1939), Lowdermilk Plan (1944), Hays 
Plan (1948), MacDonald Report (1951), Bunger Plan (1952), Israeli 
Seven-Year Plan (1953), Main/Unified Plan (1953), Cotton Plan 
(1954), Johnston Plan (1955), Israeli Ten-Year Plan/National 
Water Plan (1956), East Ghor Canal Stage I (1958). 
1. Ionides Survey 
In 1938, the Peel Commission, chartered by the British Colo- 
nial Office to investigate the tensions in Palestine between 
Arabs and Jewish settlers, commissioned a hydrographic survey of 
the Jordan Valley.  The mission of this survey was to explore the 
potential for agricultural expansion and new settlement areas in 
the region.  Irrigation engineer Michael Ionides completed this 
survey and published his results in his, "Report on the Water 
Resources of TransJordan and their Development." 
Ionides concluded that the Jordan Valley, between the Sea of 
Galilee and the Dead Sea, if irrigated, could support new settle- 
ments.  In his report Ionides stated: 
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There is no escape from the conclusion that the only 
source of water on a scale large enough to affect the 
capacity of the country to any appreciable extent is 
from the two main rivers of the country, the Jordan and 
the Yarmouk.  Therefore, the sole means of gaining a 
substantial increase in agricultural development, in 
the guantitative sense of providing room for increased 
population, lies in the canalization of the Jordan and 
Yarmouk. (Lowi, 1993, pp. 44) 
In his plan, Ionides proposed irrigating the most fertile 
land in the Jordan Valley, the Terrace of the Ghor.  This ancient 
sea bed stretches 100 kilometers from the Sea of Galilee in the 
north to the Dead Sea in the south.  Ionides idea was to con- 
struct a canal alongside the Ghor, which would be used to divert 
water from the Jordan and the Yarmouk.  He also suggested using 
the Sea of Galilee to store the winter flood waters of the 
Yarmouk river.  While the plan was never implemented, due to the 
breakup of the Peel Commission, Ionides' ideas formed the basis 
for subsequent Arab river management/irrigation proposals. 
2. Lowdermilk-Hays Plans 
Dr. Walter Clay Lowdermilk, deputy chief of the U.S. Soil 
Conservation Service, visited Palestine in 1939 in the course of 
a worldwide soil erosion and conservation survey.  During his 
visit Lowdermilk realized that the region had the need for a more 
efficient water and energy management plan.  Lowdermilk conceived 
such a plan, and in 1944 it was published as Palestine: Land of 
Promise. 
To increase water efficiency, Lowdermilk proposed the 
diversion of Yarmouk River waters to the edge of the Jordan 
Valley to be used for irrigation, and the diversion of the upper 
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Jordan to the coastal and northern Negev to irrigate that area. 
His plan to increase available energy centered around the fact 
that the Dead Sea is located 400 meters below sea level, in the 
deepest valley on the Earth's surface.  Lowdermilk proposed a 
canal/tunnel to convey Mediterranean seawater into the rift, and 
then to use the force of the water, as it dropped 400 meters, to 
power hydroelectric plants. 
In his plan, Lowdermilk called for the establishment of a 
Jordan Valley Authority, modeled after the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.  He envisioned his plan as being beneficial to the 
people of both Palestine and Transjordan in the areas of water 
conservation, flood control, irrigation, drainage, soil reclama- 
tion and conservation, rangeland improvement, reforestation, and 
extraction of minerals from the Dead Sea (Hillel, 1994, pp. 159). 
Lowdermilk's plan was further elaborated by James Hays in his 
1948 report: "T.V.A. on the Jordan."  However, neither plan was 
ever implemented, partly due to regional conflict between the 
newly established state of Israel, and her Arab neighbors and 
also due to the fact that no understanding had been reached 
regarding the equitable allocation of Jordan River waters between 
the riparians. 
3. MacDonald Report 
The MacDonald Report, or "Report on the Proposed Extension 
of Irrigation in the Jordan Valley", was the irrigation scheme of 
the consulting firm, Sir Murdoch MacDonald and Partners, hired by 
Jordan in 194 9.  The report followed essentially the same recom- 
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mendations as the Ionides Survey; outlining a plan for the 
irrigation of both sides of the lower Jordan River.  The firm 
stated in their report what was to become a fundamental issue in 
the management of Jordan River basin waters: "the waters in a 
catchment area should not be diverted outside that area unless 
the requirements of all those who use or genuinely intend to use 
the waters within the area have been satisfied." (Lowi, 1993, pp. 
49)  This assertion was in direct opposition to the principles by 
which the Israelis were developing their own water management 
plan: the Seven Year Plan. 
4. Seven Year Plan 
Inspired by the Lowdermilk-Hays plan, the Israeli government 
drew up its own national water management plan.  The Seven Year 
Plan, published in 1953, had as its goal doubling the nation's 
water supply, thereby tripling the area of irrigated land, by 
1961.  The resulting increase in agricultural production was 
intended to support three-quarters of the total food requirements 
for a population of two million people. 
The Plan would integrate "all the water resources of the 
country into a comprehensive country-wide network which would 
collect water wherever it is available and distribute it to the 
areas where it is needed." (Lowi, 1993, pp. 49)  Included in the 
plan was a central irrigation system to draw water from the less 
arid north to the more arid south, as well as a plan to develop 
the hydroelectric potential of a Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal, as 
first mentioned in the Lowdermilk plan.  Contrary to the MacDona- 
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Id Report of Jordan, Israel's Seven Year Plan had every intention 
of removing water from the Jordan basin for use elsewhere in the 
country.  Obviously there was not enough water in the Jordan 
system to support both plans.   This fact only served to intensi- 
fy tensions in the area with regard to water distribution. 
5. Bunger Plan 
Prior to the publication of the Seven Year Plan, the United 
States and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) 
became interested in sponsoring a unilateral water plan for the 
Kingdom of Jordan.  Both the United States and UNRWA had as their 
immediate concern the provision of relief for the mass of Arab 
refugees that were streaming into Jordan as a result of repeated 
clashes with the Israelis.  The United States was also convinced 
that the Middle East was a vital bulwark in the defense against 
communism, and that efforts must be made to promote peace and 
stability in the area. 
The Bunger Plan envisioned a joint Syrian-Jordanian built 
dam on the Yarmouk River at Maqarin, and a diversion canal along 
the East Ghor.  The Plan was to provide irrigable land for the 
settlement of 100,000 refugees, and employment on the dam itself. 
One-fifth of the UNRWA budget was earmarked for the Plan, which 
was signed in March 1953.  One month later work on the project 
commenced. 
6. Unified Plan 
Although the UNRWA was enthusiastic about the prospects for 
the Bunger Plan, it asked the U.S. Department of State to procure 
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a study for the unified development of the Jordan River system. 
"It explained its volte-face thus: it wanted to be assured that 
the Bunger project was the most economical, and that the funds it 
was about to commit 'would not be rendered nugatory by other 
projects undertaken by other interests in the same watershed.'" 
(Lowi, 1993, pp. 83)  Thus in 1952 the firm of Charles T. Main 
Inc. of Boston, Mass. began to develop a plan for the management 
of Jordan River basin waters without regard for political bound- 
aries.  The emphasis of the unified or "Main" Plan was irrigation 
and hydroelectric power production. 
The Plan was presented to the UNRWA and the Government of 
the united States in August 1953, and to the riparian states in 
September of 1953.  The report, which favored in-basin usage of 
Jordan River waters, included: (1) the irrigation of the Upper 
Jordan basin using the headwaters of the Jordan River, (2) the 
use of the Sea of Galilee to store flood flows of the Jordan and 
Yarmouk Rivers, (3) The irrigation of the Lower Jordan basin 
using canals along the east and west sides of the Jordan River 
south of the Sea of Galilee.  The allocation of water between the 
riparians was proposed at 394 million cubic meters for Israel, 
774 million cubic meters for Jordan, and 45 million cubic meters 
for Syria, for a total of 1,213 million cubic meters.  The cost 
of the unified Plan was estimated at $121 million dollars, most 
of which would be borne by the United States. (Lowi, 1993, pp. 
86) 
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7. Johnston Plan 
In 1953 Ambassador Eric Johnston, at the behest of President 
Eisenhower, traveled to the states of the Jordan River basin in 
an attempt to secure agreement for the unified management of the 
water system.  The plan which originated as the Unified Plan thus 
came to be known, throughout its various iterations, as the 
Johnston Plan.  Through separate negotiations with Israel and the 
Arab states during the 24 month period from October 1953 to 
October 1955, Ambassador Johnston completed a plan to provide 
distribution of surface water sources in the Jordan River basin. 
Although both parties agreed on the technical details of the 
plan, Johnston was never able to conclude a formal agreement due 
to Arab League resistance to a plan which would give Israel de 
facto  recognition. 
The Johnston formula allocated the following quantities: 
(1) To Lebanon: 35 million cubic meters/year from the 
Hasbani. (2) To Syria: 20, 22, and 90 million cubic 
meters/year from the Banias, upper Jordan, and Yarmouk 
headwaters, respectively. (3) To the Hashemite Kingdom: 
100, 337, 243 million cubic meters/year from the lower 
Jordan, Yarmouk, and tributary wadis, respectively. (4) 
To Israel: 375 and 25 million cubic meters/year from 
the upper Jordan and the downstream Yarmouk, respec- 
tively. (Hillel, 1994, pp. 161) 
The plan also included provisions for an engineering board and a 
water master to ensure that all parties were conforming to the 
agreed upon allocations. 
One important factor that was overlooked in the plan was the 
allocation of ground water.  The plan also contained a proviso 
allowing Israel to utilize seasonal overflows that were still 
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available after the other riparians had taken their shares.  This 
proviso, which gave Israel a basis for historical water claims, 
was later to become important in future negotiations.  While a 
formal agreement was not signed, both the Israelis and the Arabs 
continued to utilize many of the elements of the Johnston Plan in 
their water sharing attempts in the years following 1955. 
8. Cotton Plan 
The Cotton Plan was the alternative plan presented by Israel 
during the Johnston negotiations.  It is important in that it 
presents one of the main points of continuing contention between 
Israeli water management desires, and those of the'Arabs.  In the 
Cotton Plan, additional water would be added to the Jordan River 
system by the diversion of the Litani River into the system.  The 
Litani would provide additional fresh water to the Sea of Galilee 
to lower the salinity of the lake.  The amount of water available 
for irrigation, under the Cotton Plan, was twice the amount than 
that of the Unified Plan.  However this proposal cut the alloca- 
tion for Jordan by 25 percent, Syria by 30 percent, while 
Israel's allocation more than tripled.  The plan was unacceptable 
to the Arab states, both for the cutting of Jordan's and Syria's 
allocation and the inclusion of the Litani in the plan, a propos- 
al to which the Arabs were adamantly opposed.  The Cotton Plan 
died on the shelf with the rest of the Johnston negotiation 
proposals. 
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9. East Ghor Canal Stage I 
Financed jointly by the governments of the United States and 
Jordan, the East Ghor Canal Project was designed to distribute 
water from the Yarmouk River to irrigate cultivable land along 
the eastern slopes of the Jordan Valley.  Construction of the 
seventy kilometer main canal began in August of 1958.  Additional 
stages of the project called for dams to be built at Mukheiba and 
Maqarin to hold the winter flood waters of the Yarmouk and to 
provide hydroelectric power.  By June 1963 the first three stages 
of the project were completed, and 123 million cubic meters of 
Yarmouk water were being diverted annually for irrigation. 
"United States' support for the project was based on the fact 
that the amount of water to be diverted conformed with the 
quantities assigned to the Kingdom under the Unified Plan (1955)- 
." (Lowi, 1993, pp. 116) 
10. Israeli Ten Year Plan 
After the failed Johnston missions, Israel proceeded with 
its own water project, now dubbed the Ten Year Plan, or National 
Water Plan.  After relocating the diversion point of the Jordan 
away from contested territory, Israel began construction on the 
main portion of the system: a 112 kilometer conduit extending 
from the northwestern shore of the Sea of Galilee to Rosh Ha'ayin 
east of Tel-Aviv.  The main conduit would join the existing 
Yarkon-Negev pipelines in the south by the mid-1960's, and bring 
150-180 million cubic meters of water annually to the coastal 
plain, and Negev desert.  The final stage of the project envi- 
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sioned a diversion of 320 million cubic meters from the Sea of 
Galilee by 1970. 
When the project was publicized by Israel, in June 1959, the 
Arab states reacted with immediate protests.  "They perceived it 
as a violation of the rights of the Arab riparians and of those 
living within the basin, a violation of international law, and a 
profound threat to the security and survival of the Arab states." 
(Lowi, 1993, pp. 119)  Israel was quick to defend its plan on the 
grounds that it fell within the water allotment that had been 
granted their country under the Johnston Plan.  It was this very 
plan however that would exacerbate the Israeli-Arab conflict, and 
eventually bring the region to war in 1967. 
At this point it would be useful to discuss the various 
conflicts that have occurred in the Jordan River basin, that the 
above attempts at water management had been unable to prevent. 
B. WATER WAR 
"There is an adage in the Middle East that war against 
Israel is impossible without Egypt and peace is impossible 
without Syria." (Neff, 1994, pp. 26)  In his Journal   of Palestine 
Studies  article, "Israel-Syria: Conflict at the Jordan River, 
1949-1967", Donald Neff asserts that Israel's continuing occupa- 
tion of the Golan Heights, is one of the essential impediments to 
peace in the Jordan River basin.  However, he argues that the key 
to the security issue that stands between the two countries is 
not the Golan Heights but rather the valley below where "the 
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runs through the midst of the Jordan river systems...."  It is in 
the Upper Jordan River Valley that the three small demilitarized 
Zones (DMZs), created under the 1949 armistice between Israel and 
Syria, are located.  These DMZ's have often been the focus of 
much regional conflict. 
1. 1951 to 1956 
The undisputed victor of the 1948 war, Israel gained 21 
percent land more than had been allocated to it by the 1947 U.N. 
partition plan; 77 percent of the land of Palestine.  Following 
the war nearly two-thirds of the original Palestinian population 
of Israel, 1.2 million people, were sent from their homes.  In 
the northern sector, along the Jordan River, Syrian forces occu- 
pied a small part of what had once been mandate Palestine.  This 
area of Syrian occupation was highly contested by the Israeli 
government.  Israel was intent on retaining all the territory it 
occupied, but refused to allow the Syrians to remain in the areas 
they had occupied.  The Israeli-Syrian Armistice agreement of 20 
July 1949, brokered by UN Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche, created 
three Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) totalling 66.5 square miles 
along the Israeli-Syrian border.  Syria was convinced to withdraw 
its troops, and in return received a pledge that sovereignty of 
the disputed areas would remain undetermined until a peace 
settlement was achieved. 
The smallest of the DMZs, located in the northeast corner of 
the Israeli-Syrian frontier, was not inhabited but its land was 
used for farming and grazing.  The central DMZ, a narrow strip 
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straddling the Jordan River, stretched from the southern edge of 
Lake Huleh to the northern tip of the Sea of Galilee.  It held 
one Jewish settlement and four Palestinian villages.  The third 
and largest DMZ in the southern part of the contested territory, 
extended from the middle of the eastern shore of the Sea of 
Galilee to the southern tip of the lake, then ran eastward to the 
Yarmouk River.   The zone had one Jewish settlement, and three 
Palestinian villages.  The rules of the armistice required the 
status quo  be maintained in the zones, with neither side gaining 
military advantage from new projects. (Neff, 1994, pp. 27) 
The united Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 
was made responsible for monitoring the DMZs.  The armistice 
allowed for the creation of Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) 
comprised of two members each from Israel and Syria and a U.N. 
chairman who was either the UNTSO Chief of Staff or his designee. 
The mission of the MACs was to ensure "full implementation" of 
the armistice agreements.  Dr. Ralph Bunche, the UN's Acting 
Mediator, provided both Israel and Syria with what he considered 
to be a proper interpretation of the agreements prior to the 
signing of the armistice.  On 26 June 1949, Bunche wrote in what 
later became known to the parties and the United Nations as the 
"authoritative interpretation" that: 
Questions of permanent boundaries, territorial sover- 
eignty, customs, trade relations and the like must be 
dealt with in the ultimate peace settlement and not in 
the armistice agreement. From the beginning of these 
negotiations our greatest difficulty has been to meet 
Israel's unqualified demand that the Syrian forces be 
withdrawn from Palestine. We have now, with_very great 
effort, persuaded the Syrians to agree to this.  I 
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trust that this will not be undone by legalistic de- 
mands about broad principles of sovereignty and admin- 
istration which in any case would be worked out in the 
practical operation of the scheme. (Neff, 1994, pp. 28) 
The area remained quiet during the first two years the 
armistice was in effect, but it appeared that tensions were 
building.  Jews moved into the area in increasing numbers, taking 
over land that had formerly belonged to Palestinians.  Their 
actions greatly angered the Palestinian farmers living in the 
DMZs.  Major General Carl von Horn of Sweden, who served as the 
fourth UNTSO Chief of Staff, described the situation: 
In 1950, the Israelis had established a new kibbutz at 
Belt Katzir in the southern demilitarized zone.  Like 
most of their kibbutzim in troubled areas, it was 
fortified with trenches and a double-apron barbed-wire 
fence from behind which its settlers sallied out to 
cultivate the surrounding land, digging irrigation 
canals to channel the water from Lake Tiberias with 
such vigor that before long no Arab farmer in the area 
was allowed into the stretch of land between the kib- 
butz and the lake....Gradually, beneath the glowering 
eyes of the Syrians, who held the high ground overlook- 
ing the zone, the area had become a network of Israeli 
canals and irrigation channels edging up against and 
always encroaching on Arab-owned property.(Neff, 1994, 
pp. 29) 
Tensions in the area heightened when, on 12 February 1951 
Israel began work in a water project that included drainage of 
the 15,000 acre Huleh Marshes.  Within a short time after the 
start of construction on the project it became clear that the 
Israeli drainage channels would impinge on Syrian territory 
within the central DMZ.  Syria complained to the MAC, whose 
response was that the project "constitutes a flagrant violation" 
of the armistice.  Asserting that they held sovereignty over the 
zone, Israel continued with the project on 25 March 1951. 
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Following a sniper attack on Israelis working on the water 
project, a clash broke out between the Israeli forces and Syrian 
troops and irregulars.  No casualties were reported, however on 
30 March Israel retaliated by forcing 785 Palestinians from their 
villages in the central DMZ and bulldozing their homes. (Neff, 
1994, pp. 29) 
On 4 April the crisis escalated even further, when seven 
Israeli soldiers on patrol in the southern DMZ were killed in an 
ambush by Syrian troops.   The next day Israel launched an air 
strike inside the southernmost DMZ, killing two Palestinian women 
and wounding six'civilians.  Approximately 1200 Palestinians were 
forced out of their homes in the central and southern DMZs.  On 2 
may the Syrians retaliated by sending a force dressed as irregu- 
lars into and just west of the central DMZ at the northern tip of 
the Sea of Galilee.  The Syrian and Israeli troops engaged and 
after a five-day fight, which took the lives of forty Israeli 
soldiers, the Syrians were repulsed. (Neff, 1994, pp. 30) 
On 18 May the United Nations Security Council passed a 
resolution calling on Israel to stop their drainage project and 
to allow the return of those Palestinians that had been expelled 
from their homes in the DMZs.  According to Lieutenant General 
William E. Riley, the current UNTSO Chief of Staff, in his report 
to the U.N. Security Council, only 350 Palestinians were allowed 
to return, and that efforts to return the others were prevented 
by Israel.  Israel stopped work on the drainage project on 6 June 
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1951, but was allowed to continue a month later after it rede- 
signed the project so as to avoid the contested territory 
Following the resolution of the Lake Huleh drainage issue 
the area remained relatively calm for the next two years.  But in 
1953 the heat over water issues came on again when the United 
States entered the stage, as a mediator in the Jordan basin's 
water situation.  As discussed earlier, it was the intent of the 
Eisenhower administration to foster peace in the Middle East by 
focusing on unifying regional water management.  The Jordanians 
had been persuaded to shelve their Bunger Plan, in favor of the 
plan that was to be worked out by United States' representative 
Ambassador Johnston.  However, a month before the scheduled 
October 1953 presentation of the American plan, Israel proceeded 
with a diversion project that included a nine-mile channel midway 
between the Huleh Marshes and the Sea of Galilee, in the Central 
DMZ. (Neff, 1994, pp. 31) 
The project was initially billed as a small diversion to 
power a hydroelectric station on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, 
however UN observers believed the project to be too large for a 
minor generating station.  The observers stated that, if complet- 
ed, the canal would siphon off large amounts of Jordan River 
water, thereby precluded the United States' proposals for region- 
al water management.  Israel later reported that the intent of 
the canal was to divert enough water to help irrigate the 
coastal plain and eventually the Negev desert.  Syria claimed 
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that the diversion of the water would result in drying up 12,000 
acres of Syrian land. (Neff, 1994, pp. 31) 
In an effort to force Israel to halt its diversion scheme, 
the United States informed Israeli officials, on 18 September 
1953, that if work on the diversion did not stop the $26 million 
in pending aid would not be forthcoming.  Originally, the Israe- 
lis were privately informed of the United States' intent to stop 
aid; no public announcement was made until 20 October 1953, in 
the face of Israeli refusals to halt work on the project. Secre- 
tary of State John Foster Dulles explained the United States' ac- 
tions: "it seemed that if the United States granted economic aid 
under these circumstances, it would tend to undermine the author- 
ity of the United Nations Truce Organization."  Dulles asserted 
that the authority of the U.N. was essential to the prevention of 
hostilities in the region. (Neff, 1994, pp. 31) 
Major General Vagn Bennike of Denmark, the UNTSO Chief of 
Staff, stated in his report to the Secretary-General that the 
Israeli project had,' by that time, denied water to two Palestin- 
ian water mills, causing them to cease work, and dried up some 
Palestinian farmland.  Bennike 's analysis of the situation, 
concluded, more importantly that control of the Jordan's flow 
gave Israel a substantial military benefit against Syria. 
According to Bennike, the deep bed of the river acted as a 
natural obstacle to soldiers and vehicles, and that the party 
that controlled the flow of the Jordan could control passage 
across the river bed. (Neff, 1994, pp. 32) 
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A week after the public announcement that the United States 
would withhold aid, on 27 October, the U.N. Security Council 
officially asked Israel to suspend work on the diversion plan. 
Within hours Israel agreed to suspend the project.  The resump- 
tion of U.S. aid to Israel was announced on 29 October 1953. 
"Quietly, Washington kept the economic sanction in effect for the 
next three years, through 1956, by insisting on tying aid to 
Israel's behavior." (Neff, 1994, pp. 32) 
2. 1957 to 1967 
While Ambassador Johnston tried for three years to unify 
Jordan River basin water management, in the end he failed, and 
the riparian states were left to their own water management 
schemes.  Israel continued with the construction of its canal, 
called the National Water Carrier, despite Arab opposition.  Even 
though the start of the canal was moved from contested territory, 
to territory within Israeli boundaries, the compromise did not 
assuage the Arab state's basic objection to the withdrawal of 
Jordan River water for use outside the Jordan Valley.  To the 
Arab states, the National Water Carrier plan represented not only 
a contravention of the rights of Arabs living in the Valley; it 
represented the strengthening of an enemy state who would now be 
in a position to absorb even greater numbers of Jewish immi- 
grants, and increase its economic potential and industrial power. 
In response to the Israeli plan, the Syrians planned to 
implement a counterdiversion of two tributaries of the upper 
Jordan.  The waters were to be conveyed via canal over the Golan 
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plateau to a tributary of the Yarmouk River, stored by a dam at 
Muheiba and used by the Jordanians in the lower Jordan Valley. 
The plan was adopted by the Arab League in 1960, but continuous 
debate between the Arab states kept the plan at an impasse.  The 
Syrians were not satisfied with a plan to divert waters; they 
pushed for an armed resolution to the Israeli water situation. 
The debate over the conflicting positions continued for four 
years. 
During that time however, tensions continued to escalate and 
on 16 March 1962, devolved into violence.  The incident involved 
fishing rights in the Sea of Galilee.  After several exchanges of 
fire between armed Israeli patrol boats and Syrian troops on 
shore, Israel launched a raid on the village of Nuqayb in the 
central DMZ, where Syrian troops had taken up position.  At least 
thirty Syrians and five Israelis were killed . 
In January 1964 President Nasir of Egypt called a conference 
of Arab Kings and Heads of State.  This conference cleared the 
air on several of the debated matters.  First, $17.5 million 
would be set aside for the construction of the Jordan headwaters 
diversion plan.  Second, $42 million would be contributed by the 
Arab states to fund a unified military command and reinforce the 
armies of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.  Third, the Arab states 
pledged to end their differences and cooperate on the issues of 
regional waters and the "Palestine Question."  (Lowi, 1993, pp. 
122) 
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In September 1964 the Arab leaders met once again.  This 
meeting yielded the following results: (1) Work on the Jordan 
River diversion was set to begin at the end of the month; (2) 
Aggression against one Arab country would be considered as 
aggression against all; (3) The Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) were established to 
defend the interests of the Palestinian people. (Lowi, 1993 pp. 
124) 
The first border clash between Syria and Israel occurred 
within six weeks of the commencement of work on the Arab diver- 
sion.  Both sides claimed the other was at fault.  This clash 
marked "...the first in a series of military responses to rival 
water projects and conflicting political-economic aims and 
interests." (Lowi, 1993, pp. 125)  While the conflict in the 
early part of 1965 was confined to the political arena, armed 
clashes resumed in the spring and summer months.  By August 1965, 
both Israel and Syria brought the conflict to new heights through 
the use of air forces.  Syria, however, did not receive the 
assistance of the planned joint military command, which seemed to 
have disappeared, and was left alone to fight the Israelis. 
The conflicts that transpired in the summer of 1965 were not 
confined to the Israeli-Syrian border.  Several confrontations 
occurred along the border between Israel and Jordan.  Water 
installations, including the National Water Carrier were the 
subjects of attacks by men the Israelis believed were members of 
al-Fatah,   a military wing of the PLO.  Tensions in the region 
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continued to escalate throughout 1965 and into the winter of 
1966.  Israeli government officials while asserting that their 
first priority was regional peace, readied their country for the 
possibility of war by completing a large arms purchase from the 
United States in the winter of 1966. 
The failure of the Arab states to come to the aid of Syria, 
as had been promised, and infighting between several other Arab 
states, resulted in the rapid disintegration of Arab unity 
throughout 1966.  The states became divided into two camps, 
Egypt, the PLO and Syria versus Saudi Arabia and Jordan.  In the 
midst of the dissention, fighting between Israel and Syria became 
more intense.  By mid-July 1966, in reported retaliation for 
Palestinian feda'iyin  sabotage against Israeli installations, the 
Israeli air force bombed the diversion works on the Banias- 
Yarmouk canal in Syria.  A second air battle occurred one month 
later, resulting in the downing of two Syrian planes over the Sea 
of Galilee. 
November 1966, brought more attacks, this time by Israeli 
troops against villages on the West Bank.  These attacks were 
allegedly in retaliation for feda'iyin  infiltrations from Jordan. 
Allegations that King Hussein was surreptitiously cooperating 
with the Israelis to wipe-out the feda 'iyin,   and his refusal to 
arm inhabitants of West Bank villages, fostered more discontent 
in the already splintering Arab community.  With the downing of 
six more Syrian jets in an April 1967 confrontation, Israeli 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol warned that "the miscalculation they 
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[Syrian leaders] were making regarding the extent of [our] pa- 
tience was very dangerous for them." (Lowi, 1993, pp. 131) 
With continuing armed skirmishes, the volatility of the 
region remained high.  The internal Arab discord also continued, 
with Jordan accusing Egypt of abandoning Syria.  In what became a 
pivotal move in the ongoing chess game of the region, Nasir of 
Egypt ordered the evacuation of United Nations Emergency Forces 
from the Sinai on 18 May 1967, and had his army take up positions 
along the border with Israel.  Within days of this move, he went 
even further by blockading the Israeli shipping through the Gulf 
of Aqaba.  The Israelis had previously announced that such an act 
would be a cause for war.  Jordan and Egypt signed a defence pact 
at the end of May, and King Hussein gave permission for Iraqi and 
Saudi troops to enter Jordan.  The government of Israel announced 
that the entry of troops into Jordan would violate the status guo 
and leave them no alternative but to defend themselves.  On 5 
June 1967, all states of the Middle East became involved in the 
third Arab-Israel war, or what would come to be known as the Six 
Day war. 
As a result of the Six Day War, the Israelis gained control 
of the Golan Plateau, the headwaters of the Banias, and access to 
the intended site of the Muheiba Dam; allowing them to stop the 
planned diversion of the Yarmouk River waters.  Although no other 
conflicts, including the 1973 War have been directly attributable 
to water, installations for water management in Syria, Israel, 
and Jordan continued to be thought of as strategic targets, and 
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were periodically attacked.  The constant regional struggle has 
slowed the pace of water development, particularly in Jordan, 
where it is most needed. 
C. POST 1967 WATER DEVELOPMENT 
Water development continued in the region following the 1967 
War at unilateral levels.  The Israelis were successful in build- 
ing and utilizing their National Water Carrier, and the Jordanian 
East Ghor Canal (renamed the King Abdullah Canal) extension was 
completed.  Two projects, meant to increase the efficiency of 
Yarmouk River utilization, were blocked due to continued dissent 
among the riparian states:  Magarin Dam Plan (1975-1981), and the 
Unity Dam Plan (1987-1990) 
1. Maqarin Dam Plan 
In the late 1970's the Carter Administration attempted to 
assist the Jordan basin riparians in developing a regional water 
management plan, in the hope that it would lead to peace.  The 
administration's plan was to dam the waters of the Yarmouk River 
at Maqarin, to enable the use of unutilized waters that had been 
flowing to the Dead Sea.  Philip Habib, then assistant U.S. 
Secretary of State, worked on the Maqarin Dam Agreement for three 
years, but was unable to forge an agreement between the three 
riparians: Israel, Jordan and Syria.  One of the conditions for 
U.S. funding of the project was the mutual agreement of the three 
riparian states to all aspects of the plan; absent such agreement 
the plan was essentially abandoned. 
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2. Unity Dam Plan 
In the 1980's Syrian use of Yarmouk waters increased and 
began to be of concern to Jordan.  As a result, in July 1987 
Jordan signed an agreement with Syria for the construction of a 
dam on the Yarmouk river, giving Syria very favorable terms.  The 
Unity Dam, to be built at Maqarin, would store 225 million cubic 
meters of Yarmouk water and would be used to generate electrici- 
ty.  Under the terms of the agreement, Syria would receive 75 
percent of the electricity generated; Jordan would receive 180 
million cubic meters of water and would bear the costs of con- 
struction.  The funding for the project, $300 million, was 
refused by the World Bank due to a veto by Israel.  The Israeli 
claim was that the project would interfere with its use of 15 
percent of Yarmouk waters, and as a co-riparian they were able to 
stop World Bank action.  The Unity Dam Project remains stalled 
and Israel has threatened to bomb the dam if it were ever built. 
(Beschorner, 1992, pp. 21) 
3. Peace Treaty of 1994 
At Arava Crossing, Israel on '2 6 October 1994, Jordan's King 
Hussein and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed a treaty 
for peace between their two countries.  "With their treaty, the 
two sides settled long-standing land and water disputes, agreed 
to broad cooperation in tourism, trade and other areas, and 
pledged that neither would let its territory be used as a staging 
area by third countries for military strikes against the other." 
(Haberman, 1994, pp. Al) 
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Article 6 of the treaty, which deals specifically with 
water sets out the following provisions: 
With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting 
settlement of all water problems between them: 
1. The parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful 
allocations of both of them in Jordan River and Yarmouk 
River waters and Arava/Araba ground water in accordance 
with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities and 
quality as set out in annex II, which shall be fully 
respected and complied with. 
2. The Parties, recognizing the necessity to find a 
practical, just and agreed solution to their water 
problems and with the view that the subject of water 
can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation 
between them, jointly undertake to insure that the 
management and development of their water resources do 
not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other 
Party. 
3. The parties recognize that their water resources are 
not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should 
be supplied for their use through various methods 
including projects of regional and international coop- 
eration. 
4. In light of paragraph' 3, with the understanding that 
cooperation in water-related subjects would be to the 
benefit of both Parties and will help alleviate their 
water shortages and that water issues along their 
entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, 
including the possibility of transfers, the Parties 
agree to search for ways to alleviate water shortage 
and to cooperate in the following fields: 
a. Development of existing and new water resources, 
increasing the water availability including cooperation 
of a regional basis as appropriate and minimizing waste 
of water resources through the chain of their uses. 
b. Prevention of contamination of water resources. 
c. Mutual assistance in the alleviation of water short- 
ages . 
d. Transfer of information and joint research and 
development in water-related subjects and review of the 
potentials for enhancement of water resources develop- 
ment and use. 
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5. The implementation of both countries undertakings 
under this Article is detailed in annex II. 
(Annex II is provided in the Appendix to this paper.) 
The current treaty is very complete with regard to water 
management and distribution, and covers many areas of interna- 
tional law considered important in the success of regional 
management.  However, this treaty has one major flaw, it only 
addresses the rights and responsibilities of two of the four 
Jordan River riparians.  The refusal of Syria and Lebanon to 
engage in face to face talks with the Israelis over water issues 
will continue to be a problem for the future.  As has been the 
experience of Egypt and Sudan, who concluded their Nile Waters 
Agreement of 1955 by dividing up the whole flow of the Nile 
without including the other riparian states, fears of increased 
water use by upstream riparians have become realized.  At some 
future date the demands of upstream riparians, on water that 
Israel and Jordan have grown accostomed to using, may present 
difficulties in Jordan basin water management. 
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IV. STRATEGIC WATER 
A. THEORIES OF WATER AND CONFLICT 
1. Thomas Homer-Dixon 
In his 1990 paper, "Environmental Change and Violent Con- 
flict", Dr. Thomas Homer-Dixon, examined the question:  "Will 
large-scale environmental changes produce violent national and 
international conflict?" Dr. Homer-Dixon states that there are 
seven environmental problems facing the developing world: green- 
house warming, ozone depletion, deforestation, acid deposition, 
degradation of agricultural land, overuse and pollution of water 
supplies, and depletion of fish stocks.  According to his analy- 
sis there is a causal relationship between the social effects of 
these environmental problems and eventual conflict.  The social 
conflicts that result from environmental problems include: 1. 
decrease in economic productivity; 2. changed regional agricul- 
tural production; 3. disruption of institutions and patterns of 
social behavior; and 4. population displacement (including 
environmental refugees and urban migration). 
Homer-Dixon divides the types of conflict that may occur as 
a result of environmental problems into three categories: simple 
scarcity conflicts, group-identity conflicts, and relative- 
deprivation conflict.  Simple scarcity conflict will arise over 
scarce resources, such as altered fresh water supplies, and is 
therefore most germane to this study.  According to Dr. Homer- 
Dixon, such conflict results from the "rational calculation of 
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State actors in a zero-sum or negative-sum situation." He 
asserts that these conflicts are best explained and predicted by 
general structural theories which include microeconomics and game 
theory. 
However, one of the problems that Homer-Dixon discusses 
regarding analysis of environmental problems as they relate to 
conflict is particularly important when looking at the Middle 
East.  "Environmental problems and their social effects—includ- 
ing conflict—cannot be easily examined independently of other 
variables, including population growth, culture, and the prevail- 
ing institutional arrangements and social relations in a soci- 
ety." The variables that need to be included in analysis of 
conflict in the Middle East, specifically relationships between 
the Arab states and Israel, will most certainly complicate a 
simple environmental analysis. 
2. Peter Gleick 
Increasingly, the world is being faced with the problems of 
scarce resources, overpopulation, and conflict between developing 
countries.  The question of the extent to which conflicts will 
arise as a result of the increasing competition for water is the 
topic of Peter Gleick's paper "Water and Conflict, Fresh Water 
Resources and International Security." According to Gleick, 
there are four characteristics which make water a likely source 
of strategic rivalry.  They are: (1) the degree of scarcity, (2) 
the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than one 
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region or state, (3) the relative power of the basin states, and 
(4) the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources. 
When these characteristics are applied to the Jordan basin 
it is not surprising to see that water in that region may well 
become a source of conflict.  Water is most definitely scarce in 
the region.  With growing populations, and a total river outflow 
of only 1.2 billion cubic meters annually, the overburdening 
Jordan River basin could worsen in the next 25 years.  The water 
supply is shared by four states, the most needy of which, Jordan, 
is located on the downstream end of the river.  The relative 
power of the basin states is the object of much contention, but 
based on the performance of individual states in the most recent 
military conflicts, it appears safe to say that Israel has the 
upper hand.  And lastly, access to alternative fresh water is a 
pressing problem for the riparian states of the Jordan River, as 
it is for all Middle Eastern nations. 
Gleick also points to the availability of water as a limit- 
ing factor in industrial development.  He states that the rate at 
which these limits will be reach depends on three factors: (1) 
the absolute availability of water; (2) the population needing to 
be supplied: and (3) the level of development desired.  Limits on 
industrial development will only promote and increase tensions 
between water-poor and water-rich nations. 
According to Gleick, there is a definite link between water 
resource problems and conflict.  "In most cases, resource inequi- 
ties will lead to more poverty, shortened lives, and misery, but 
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not directly to violent conflict.  But in some cases, these 
resource gaps will increase the likelihood of international 
disputes, create refugees who cross borders, and decrease the 
ability of a nation to resist economic and military activities by 
neighboring countries." (Gleick, 1993, pp. 92) 
Peter Gleick uses a series of indices in his paper to 
measure water resource vulnerability.  The first such index 
measures water withdrawals as a percentage of renewable water 
supply.  According to this measure, countries which draw more 
than one-third of their total supply are in a vulnerable posi- 
tion.  Jordan and Israel come out near the top of the list of 
high water use countries.  Each country withdraws 110 percent of 
their renewable water supply annually. 
The second index measures population growth, and the per 
capita availability of water in 1990 compared to the estimated 
per capita availability in 2025, based on current growth rates. 
According to this second index, both Jordan and Israel will 
experience severe water shortages in the near future.  Jordan's 
per capita annual water availability is projected to drop from 
260 cubic meters in 1990 to 80 cubic meters in 2025.  The per 
capita water availability for Israel is projected at 470 cubic 
meters in 1990 dropping to 310 cubic meters in 2025. 
The third index used by Gleick measures the extent to which 
water supplies are shared, and thus the potential for competition 
with regard to water resources.  In this case both Jordan and 
Israel rank low on the list with only 36 and 21 percent respec- 
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tively of total river flow originating outside their borders. Of 
course in the case of Israel, the borders discussed are post 1967 
and include the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon Security Zone; 
both of which contain headwaters of the Jordan River. 
The final index is the measure of a country's reliance on 
hydroelectric power as a fraction of total electrical supply. 
None of the Jordan River basin states appear on the list of 
countries evaluated, indicating that the reliance on hydroelec- 
tric power as a percentage of total electricity generated is less 
than 50 percent. 
Another challenge to future water management in the Jordan 
basin is uncertainty concerning the effects of possible climate 
changes on water flows.  Large-scale climate models for the 
Middle East show a large degree of uncertainty as to the nature 
of the climate changes and their severity.  "For the region of 
the Jordan and Litani Rivers, three different climate models 
estimate that precipitation could change by an amount between -14 
and +48 percent." (Gleick, 1994, pp. 6)  The inconclusive nature 
of climactic predictions has added to the difficulty of water 
management in the region. 
Applying Gleick1s measures it appears likely that the Jordan 
River riparians are facing a situation which may result in 
conflict if measures are not taken to mitigate the affects of 
such factors as degree of scarcity, population growth, extent of 
resource sharing, and climactic changes. 
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3. Thomas Naff 
In his 1993 essay, "Water Scarcity, Resource Management, and 
Conflict in the Middle East", Thomas Naff discusses the linkages 
between Middle East water resources and potential conflict. 
According to Naff: "Between 1995 and 2005, Israel, Jordan and the 
occupied territories could begin to experience acute and progres- 
sively worsening perennial water shortages and quality degrada- 
tion analogous to the three areas running out of renewable 
sources of fresh-water."  If this occurs it is conceivable that 
conflict could result.  Dr. Naff does not envision outright 
warfare due to the disparity in power among the Jordan basin 
states, however, he does believe the shortages could lead to 
instability and internal civil unrest in the region. 
Only through better management of water resources, does Naff 
believe the conflict that will result from water shortages can be 
avoided.  In his analysis Naff lists eight factors that compli- 
cate water planning and management, they include: 
o Relationships of power, position and interest 
o Territorial and ownership disputes 
o uncertainty about key facts 
o Political and ideological rivalries 
o Jurisdictional disputes stemming from the fact that 
watersheds and political boundaries are rarely coterminous 
o Absence of effective institutional legal machinery for 
settling riparian disputes 
o Ingrained tendency toward inaction without the motivation 
of a crisis 
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o Deeply rooted cultural and social attitudes toward water 
that make change difficult 
Given the difficulties listed above, Naff's analysis focuses on 
"how to manage a scarce vital resource in conditions of bellicose 
rivalry while avoiding open conflict." 
Given the inherent difficulties in managing water resources 
across international boundaries, Dr. Naff proposes that a 
basinwide water management authority be created to handle the 
issue.  He also proposes that the riparian states, particularly 
Jordan and Israel reduce their irrigated agriculture by at least 
40 percent.  This amount would allow the states to break even 
with regard to supply and demand for water.  However, this may 
prove difficult because, while it would be economically sound to 
lessen reliance on agriculture in favor of light industry, states 
such as Israel are in the business of agriculture for strategic, 
not economic reasons.  Dr. Naff also asserts that continuous 
investment in technical improvements in water management and 
conservation is essential to ending the problems associated with 
water shortages in the region. 
B. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
The aforementioned analyses certainly point to a number of 
factors that could lead to conflict between the states of the 
Jordan River basin.  Thomas Homer-Dixon's broadbrush approach 
indicates that it is the condition of scarcity that will lead to 
conflict.  However, as he stated, environmental problems cannot 
be divided from other variables when analyzing the probability of 
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conflict.  In the Jordan River'basin, the "other variables" 
include such issues as the question of a Palestinian homeland, 
and Arab non-recognition of Israel.  Variables of great impor- 
tance in the region, that, added to the issue of competition over 
water, could lead to conflict in the region. 
Peter Glieck's analysis of the causes of conflict over water 
include factors such as: the degree of scarcity, the degree to 
which the water resource is shared, the possibility of changing 
water flows due to climate changes, the dramatic increases in 
population, and the difficulty in accessing alternative sources 
of water.  All of those factors would lead to the belief that 
conflict over water in the Jordan River basin is likely.  Thomas 
Naff's assertions are in agreement with those of Homer-Dixon and 
Glieck, in that the unavailability of water resources, combined 
with increasing competition, will lead to conflict if steps are 
not taken to ease the apparent water shortage. 
In addition to the issues discussed above, the Jordan River 
basin is faced with other factors that may add to regional ten- 
sions.  They include: control of headwaters and aquifers in occu- 
pied territories, threats to Syrian water supplies, and Lebanese 
denial of Israeli usage of water surpluses. 
Regarding the issue of control of the aquifers and headwa- 
ters in the occupied territories, it is unlikely that Israel will 
be willing to relinquish its hold on the main sources of its 
water supply. 
Almost one-third of Israel's fresh water (130 billion 
gallons per year) is derived from aquifers in what 
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Israel calls Judea and Samaria, and what the Arabs call 
the West Bank.  Israel cannot survive, especially with 
the prospect of increased immigration and the natural 
population increase of both Jews and Arabs, without 
retaining access to this water or replacing it from 
some other source.  That is a real security problem. 
(Ploss, 1992, pp. 20) 
Therefore, control of the West Bank aquifers, and the headwaters 
of the Jordan located in the Golan Heights and Lebanon Southern 
Security Zone, will remain critical to Israel.  Both Syria and 
Lebanon have expressed unwillingness to negotiate with Israel 
over water issues until Israel withdraws from these contested 
areas. (Beschorner, 1992, pp. 25) 
A second factor which may be a cause for concern, for Jordan 
especially, is the possibility that Syria may be facing a threat 
to its Euphrates River water supply.  Turkey is in the process of 
building a series of more than 20 dams on the rivers that provide 
the headwaters to the Euphrates.  By the next century, when the 
$21 billion Great Anatolia Project in Turkey is completed the 
annual flow of the Euphrates River within Syria could potentially 
be reduced by as much as 12 billion cubic meters (Homer-Dixon, 
1990, pp. 3).  Additionally, the water will contain the fertil- 
izers, pesticides and salts of the Turkish irrigation systems 
through which it will pass.  If Syria turns to the Yarmouk River, 
on its border with Jordan for additional water supplies, Jordan's 
main source of water could be reduced.  This would have a major 
impact on Jordan directly, affect Israel due to their water 
agreements with Jordan, and escalate regional tensions over 
water. 
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A third, but surely by no means final factor which could 
exacerbate regional tensions, is the refusal of the Lebanese to 
allow Israel to utilize apparent water surpluses from the Litani 
River.  From the 1920's, when the details of the Balfour Declara- 
tion were being worked out, the Israelis have been insisting that 
the waters of the Litani are crucial to the economic survival of 
the Jewish state.  Israel has attempted to include provisions for 
Litani River use in every major water negotiation, including the 
Johnston negotiations of the 1950's.  The Lebanese have consis- 
tently refused to discuss any prospects for Israeli use of Litani 
water, and Lebanese hydrologists insist the there is in fact no 
surplus from which to draw. 
Israel's relationship with Lebanon has steadily declined 
since the 1982 invasion, and the downfall of the Marionite 
Christian government, which Israel had supported.  The Shiite 
Muslims that inhabit southern Lebanon continue to view Israel 
with enmity, and are unwilling to enter into negotiations with 
them over water.  Despite persistent rumors that Israel is using 
its position in the Southern Lebanon Security Zone, to divert 
water from the Litani River, no evidence of such diversion has 
been produce (Beschorner, 1992, pp. 26).  However, the inability 
of Israel to access what it views as wasted water surpluses, 
water that it so badly needs, will remain a sore point in the 
region and will continue as a source of tension. 
Even in the face of much apparent tension, it is unlikely 
that conflict on a large scale, such as regional war, will break 
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out in the near future due to the disparity in military power 
among the riparian states; as Thomas Naff pointed out in his 
analysis.  However, conflict on a smaller scale is certainly 
likely unless steps are taken to mitigate that conflict.  There 
are, however, several factors which could serve to lessen or 
mitigate the potential for conflict.  These factors include: 
regional water management treaties (as have been discussed previ- 
ously) , international water agreements, and high technology 
methods of conserving existing water and/or supplying the region 
with additional water.  If these factors are properly implemented 
it may be possible to ensure that the Jordan River 'basin states 
do not place themselves in the position of resorting to armed 




V. DECREASING THE RISK OF CONFLICT 
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW 
One way in which the risk of conflict can be lessened is 
through the implementation of international and regional water 
usage agreements.  In 1991 the International Law Commission of 
the United Nations completed the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses.  This law set forth general 
principles for the use of shared waterways.  These principles 
include: the equitable utilization of shared resources, the 
obligation not to cause harm to other riparian states, the 
obligation to notify and inform riparian nations of changes that 
would effect them, the obligation to share data, the obligation 
for cooperative river management, and the obligation to solve 
disputes peacefully. 
Regarding the principle of equitable utilization, equitable 
in this case does not mean equal.  The United Nations has allowed 
for a wide variety of factors, including population, geography, 
availability of alternative resources and so on, to be considered 
during negotiations over the allocation of water rights (Gleick, 
1993, 107).  With regard to the principle of prevention of sig- 
nificant harm to other states, harmful actions are permitted, but 
compensation or mitigation are required as alternatives to 
avoidance. 
International Law requires that all disputes between coun- 
tries be resolved peacefully, and this includes disputes over 
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water.  However the success of International Law relies, to a 
large extent, on the cooperation of the nations involved in the 
dispute, and their willingness to submit to international deci- 
sions.  Therefore, regional treaties between the states of the 
Jordan River basin may prove to be more effective in dealing with 
water disputes.  Of course all riparian states must participate 
in water discussions, allowing technical agreements on water to 
be settled and "de-linked" from the question of Palestinian 
independence. 
B. ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS 
Water, as all other economic goods, will reach a natural 
price when equilibrium between supply and demand is achieved. 
The concept of scarcity with regard to water could be viewed, in 
terms of economics, as a resource for which the price has been 
kept artificially low therefore stimulating more demand, at the 
low price, than the available supply.  As demand increases, the 
efficiency of water usage can be increased by allowing highly 
valued uses to bid in the market for the shares currently held by 
the less highly valued uses.  Users could obtain more water if 
they are willing to pay the price. 
One cost of water that may limit increases in a region's 
water supply is the cost of reclamation.  "Water in a river may 
rush through a turbine at a dam, then be diverted to a factory 
for cooling purposes,... it may then enter a public water supply, 
be used domestically, be returned to ground via septic tank, and 
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be pumped up hundreds of miles away for irrigation purposes." 
(Hirshliefer, I960, pp. 2)  Since water is not limited to a 
single function for a given supply, its uses may be expanded 
given an investment in the technology necessary to do so. 
Sound economic policies indicate that the proper use of a 
scarce resource is where it will produce the greatest benefits. 
In the case of agriculture in arid areas, especially the growth 
of high water consuming plants such as cotton and citrus fruits, 
the water used could be put to better use in other sectors of the 
economy.  A 1990 report by the Israeli Comptroller specified the 
agricultural policies of the country as causing many of the 
current water problems.  "The Comptroller's report cited the low 
price of water to the agricultural sector as the main culprit 
causing a decline in the water supply and distortions in the 
sector itself; the low price encouraged excessive pumping for the 
cultivation of crops which, by concealing a water subsidy, did 
not contribute to the country's real economic growth." (Drezon- 
Tepler, 1994, pp. 292)  The low prices also created an artificial 
demand for increasing the water supply by implementing expensive 
waterworks projects whose cost could not be covered by the 
produce grown.  The Comptroller's recommendations to correct the 
situation called for increased water prices, especially for agri- 
culture, until they equal true cost, and the transfer of water 
system management from the Agriculture Ministry to an impartial 
government body. 
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The Comptroller's report validated the recommendations of a 
number of policy analysts who had previously counselled similar 
reforms in the water system.  According to the analysts the 
country water management policies "...had not successfully 
allocated the commodity under conditions of water shortage to 
meet the competing demands of a developing, diversified economy." 
(Drezon-Tepler, 1994, 'pp. 292)  Of immediate importance in the 
reform of the water system is raising the price of water to 
reflect the cost of supply.  This rise in price, the analysts 
argue, would generate beneficial effects that would strengthen 
Israel economically and serve to alleviate tension in the area 
over water resources.  An increase in the price of water would 
encourage Israeli farmers to reduce their consumption of irriga- 
tion water and adopt more efficient water-use technologies.   The 
increase would also promote the transfer of water rights from 
low-value agricultural uses to higher-value industrial uses.   To 
date Israel has replaced the Water Commissioner, and has taken 
some steps to raise the price, but much more work remains to be 
done. (Drezon-Tepler, 1994, pp. 292) 
The water system in Jordan is in need of many of the same 
reforms as the Israeli system.  Jordanian water expert, Elias 
Salameh, recommends "curtailing water for irrigation, reducing 
its subsidy and instead directing the resource to industry which 
earns more foreign currency."(Drezon-Tepler, 1994, pp. 292)  In a 
region such as this, the scarcity of water demands that the 
employment of the resource yield a product valuable enough to 
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induce a profit over the cost of the investment; which clearly 
agriculture in Jordan does not. 
C. INCREASING WATER SUPPLIES 
Another way to lessen the risk of a regional conflict 
over water is to increase water supplies.  There are only two 
feasible ways to increase water supplies: bring in new supplies, 
and/or capture unused portions of current supplies thereby 
increasing efficiency of water usage.  The possible methods of 
acquiring additional water include: cloud seeding, desaliniza- 
tion, and water importation.  The efficiency of current water 
supplies can be maximized by utilizing innovations in agriculture 
and wastewater treatment. 
1. Cloud Seeding 
Since the 1950's Israeli scientists have been experimenting 
with the practice of cloud seeding in an attempt to increase 
rainfall over their country.  "The purpose of cloud seeding is to 
induce the formation within the cloud of crystals that can act as 
foci for the formation of raindrops and thus hasten the occur- 
rence of rain." (Hillel, 1994, pp. 236)  In 1961 the Israelis 
began systematic cloud seeding using silver iodide microcrystals 
to enhance rain formation. 
The result of the first experiment (1961-67) produced an 
apparent 15 percent enhancement, while the second experiment 
(1969-75) produced an apparent 13 percent enhancement, over the 
target areas.  Since 1975 the clouds over northern Israel have 
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been seeded on an operational basis.  On certain days, with 
perfect cloud seeding conditions, the rain enhancement over, the 
catchment area of the Sea of Galilee was increased by as much as 
34 percent. 
One possible downfall of cloud seeding is that by "milking" 
the rain out of the clouds over a specific area, the rain that 
might otherwise have fallen elsewhere could be affected.  Howev- 
er, studies of Israeli cloud seeding have shown that areas of 
Jordan and Syria that lie downwind of the Israeli target areas 
have experienced increased, rather then diminished, rainfall. 
While research for further enhancement of rainfall will continue 
in the region, scientists realize that the method offers only 
limited potential for increasing the area's available water 
resources. (Hillel, 1994, pp. 39) 
2. Desalinization 
A possible sources of fresh water for the Jordan Valley 
region is desalinization.  Actually a very old technique, taught 
by Aristotle and used by Julius Caesar, desalinization is the 
process of drawing fresh water from salty or brackish water. 
Several different methods are available including: distillation, 
freezing, electrodialysis, and reverse osmosis. 
The distillation process is the most common method of 
desalinization.  During this process salt water is evaporated, 
the steam is then gathered and recondensed to obtain pure water. 
The problem with the distillation process is that it requires a 
great amount of energy to vaporize water.  It is therefore often 
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performed in conjunction with power plants, where excess heat can 
be used in the evaporation process. 
An alternative to distillation, is to freeze the salt water, 
wash off the salty brine, then rethaw the ice to obtain water 
that is less salty, however not as pure as with distillation. 
Electrodialysis and reverse osmosis both utilize membranes to 
filter out the pure water from the saline.  The difference 
between the two methods is with the force used to push the salt 
water through the membrane: electromotive force in the case of 
the former, mechanical force or pressure in the latter case. 
Whichever method is used, it is the cost of desalinization 
that has kept the Jordan Valley states from further utilizing it 
to produce the resource they so desperately need.   In 1985, the 
prototype for a large-scale desalting plant to be constructed at 
Ashdod, Israel was completed.  The project, a joint U.S.-Israel 
venture, was abandoned because the high cost of energy needed to 
operate the plant made the process uneconomical(Ploss, 1992, pp. 
21).  The current cost of desalinized seawater ranges from 1 to 
1.5 dollars per cubic meter.   In Israel the cost of current 
fresh water (not desalted) supplies is in the range of .45 
dollars per cubic meter.  However, the price charged to farmers 
is .15 to .25 dollars per cubic meter while the price charged for 
industrial or domestic use is as much as twice the cost of the 
water.  Therefore, while the price gap between current sources of 
water and water acquired through desalinization is closing, 
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desalinized water is still too expensive for agricultural use. 
(Hiiiei, 1994, pp. 253) 
The only hope for the use of desalinization as the panacea 
of the region is to lower its cost.  Through continued technical 
innovation, economies of scale, and more efficient use of energy, 
this cost may be brought down.  One proposal that may provide the 
huge amount of energy necessary to provide the region with usable 
amounts of desalinized water is to create a canal from the 
Mediterranean, or the Red Sea, to the Dead Sea. 
a. Med-Dead Project 
The Dead Sea exists in the deepest rift on the Earth's 
surface: 400 meters below sea level.  Water flowing through a 
canal would have to drop significantly to reach the Dead Sea, and 
in the process could be harnessed to power hydro-electric plants. 
Proposals for such a project date back to the late nineteenth 
century, when Theodore Herzl, a French engineer, first suggested 
it.  Later, Walter Clay Lowdermilk revived the idea in his 1938 
U.S. Department of Agriculture survey.  Lowdermilk's proposal 
called for a seven mile concrete-lined canal plus a twenty-mile 
tunnel to carry sea water from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea. 
The plan would produce 150,000 to 220,000 kilowatts of power, to 
serve the needs of 100,000 people. (Ploss, 1992, pp. 21) 
Irwin Ploss and Jonathan Rubenstein, with the New York based 
Center for Research on Institutions and Social Policy Inc., have 
designed a 1990's version of the Med-Dead Plan.  Their proposal 
includes the enlargement of the Dead Sea, from 400 to 800 square 
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miles, to provide a greater evaporation surface, and the con- 
struction of a 40 mile long passageway from Ashdod to the Dead 
Sea area south of Sodom, to transport Mediterranean seawater. 
According to calculations made by consultants on the project: 
A flow of water of 2.5 trillion gallons annually would 
enable turbines to generate 1000 megawatts of power, 
about three-fourths of the output of the Hoover Dam, 
and about one-fourth of Israel's present power use. 
The power would then be transmitted back to the Medi- 
terranean shore, where it would be used to desalt 350 
to 400 billion gallons of water per year, almost all of 
Israel's current water consumption. (Ploss, 1992, pp. 
22) 
Ploss and Rubenstein's plan would require the excavation of 
440 miles adjacent to the Dead Sea for its enlargement; approxi- 
mately 1500 times greater than the work required on the Panama 
Canal excavation.  This would provide for a surface area of 840 
square miles, and an annual evaporation 2.5 trillion gallons of 
Dead Sea water.  The evaporation rate is critical to ensuring 
that the inflow would not exceed the outflow, raising the level 
of the Dead Sea, and reducing power generated. 
There are several potential problems associated with the 
plan: the increased size of the Dead Sea would result in in- 
creased condensation, and therefore possibly increase humidity in 
the area; the saltiness of the Dead Sea would increase; there 
would be a change in the pressure over the rift as soil is 
replaced with rock.  The degree of importance of each of these 
changes has not yet been analyzed, however Ploss and Rubenstein 
also point to the potential benefits of the plan.  The most 
obvious benefit is the increase in water and power, to be shared 
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between Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians.  There would also 
be an increase in the employment opportunities in the area as the 
construction gets underway.  The excavated material could be put 
to good use, creating a level plain for future solar energy 
production. 
The plan is still in its infancy and will require several 
more years to complete the necessary studies, arrange financing, 
and assemble the specialists and the equipment.  Then approxi- 
mately ten additional years to complete the excavation, build the 
conduit and the generators, generate the power and begin desali- 
nization. (Ploss, 1992, pp. 23)  The plan is expected to cost 
several billions of dollars, and therefore would require financ- 
ing from international sources.  However, an analysis of the 
benefits derived from the plentiful supply of water to the region 
may show that the cost is indeed feasible. 
jb. Red-Dead Project 
An alternate proposal to the Med-Dead project, is the Red- 
Dead project.  This project would be similar to the Med-Dead, 
however the canal would transport water from the Red Sea, rather 
than the Mediterranean, to the Dead Sea.  This is envisioned as a 
joint Israeli-Jordanian project, with international funding (at 
least $2 billion), that would contribute to tourism in the area, 
support a growth in farmed fish production, provide a Red Sea 
port for joint usage, and provide energy for desalinization.  The 
project is estimated to take eight years to complete, however 
will not be ready for implementation until more detailed engi- 
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neering and economic plans have been worked out. (Peres, 1993, 
pp. 144) 
3. Water Importation 
a. Water Bags 
One recent innovation that could be used to deliver new 
supplies of fresh water is to float in huge bags full of the 
needed liquid.  The concept of towing bags is not new, but the 
new, larger size bag is a definite improvement on an old idea. 
"The difference now is that, rather than carrying up to 1000 
cubic meters of water, new bags soon to be in production by the 
Medusa Corporation of Canada may be able to hold as much as 3.5 
million cubic meters." (Scudder, 1994, pp. 13)  The Turkish 
government has consulted with other makers of these water bags, 
and is offering treated water from the Malaygat river near 
Antaliya in southern Turkey for $0.08 per cubic meter.  Initial 
estimates of the total cost of the towed water are between $0.60 
and $0.70 per cubic meter, and would prove to be more cost 
effective than desalinization. (Scudder, 1994, pp. 13) 
b. Water Pipelines 
A second method of water importation is the utilization of a 
pipeline.  In 1987 Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal proposed a 
transnational water transfer plan, later dubbed the "Peace Pipe- 
line." The plan called for two pipelines to carry water from 
southern Turkey to the Persian Gulf states in the east and to 
Saudi Arabia in the west.  Along the route of the pipeline, water 
could be supplied to Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Israel.  The prohib- 
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itive cost, $20 billion, the regional instability, and the time 
needed for construction, 10 years, were all factors contributing 
to the tabling of the plan for the near future. 
A smaller version of the plan, called the "Mini-Peace 
Pipeline" is less grandiose than its predecessor and therefore 
may prove to be more feasible.  This plan calls for the convey- 
ance of water from Turkey only as far as Syria or Jordan, and 
would provide an additional 600 million cubic meters per year to 
the region.  In favor of pipeline projects, Israeli Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres stated, "Pipelines for water, oil, 
and gas should be laid out with an economic rationale and not 
based on the old strategic worries." (Peres, 1993, pp. 129) 
Another possible water transfer plan would divert water from 
the Litani river in Lebanon to Jordan.  Such a transfer could 
provide as much as 100 million cubic meters annually to the 
Jordanians.  However, the feasibility of this project is depen- 
dant on peace between the two states, as well as adequate compen- 
satory measures for the Lebanese. 
D. CONSERVING EXISTING WATER SUPPLIES 
1. Agricultural Innovations 
Hydrologists agree that the single most water-consuming 
human activity is agriculture. With the exception of Israel, 
where new technologies are used, most of the irrigation methods 
currently in use in the Middle East are wasteful.  "Some esti- 
mates suggest that 70 percent of total water use, and 90 percent 
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of irretrievable consumptive use of water, is due to irrigation." 
(Mathews, 1992, pp. 26)  City dwellers in need of sanitary drink- 
ing water are finding themselves in competition with farmers over 
scarce resource supplies.  Therefore it is incumbent upon the 
region to utilize the water saving technologies that have been 
developed in places like Israel and California if they are going 
to continue to pursue local agriculture. 
Among the technologies currently available is drip irriga- 
tion.  This method, used in Israel and recently adopted in 
Jordan, utilizes porous or perforated piping to deliver water 
directly to the roots of the plants.  Computers run the irriga- 
tion systems, getting information from the fields and subsequent- 
ly opening or closing the appropriate valves.  "This keeps evapo- 
ration and seepage losses extremely low.  Because water is 
applied frequently at low doses, optimal moisture conditions are 
maintained for the crop, boosting yields, and salt does not 
accumulate in the root zone." (Postel, 1993, pp. 68)  This method 
has allowed farmers to more than double their output while using- 
the same amount of water.  According to kibbutz manager Zvi Rub 
"7000 cubic meters of water per quarter acre were used for 
bananas each year when they were flood irrigated, when we started 
to drip-irrigate we were down to 2000 cubic meters." (Vesilind, 
1993, pp. 63) 
2. Wastewater Treatment 
Another way in which fresh water supplies can be conserved 
is through the use of treated wastewater for crop irrigation. 
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Domestic wastewater contains many of the same chemicals that are 
used in fertilizer: nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium.  If 
properly treated, wastewater is perfectly safe for irrigating 
crops.  This method would keep sewage out of rivers and streams, 
and lessen the health hazards presented by farmers using untreat- 
ed, polluted river water to irrigate their fields.  "Israel has 
pioneered in the use of recycled urban wastewater for agricul- 
ture; a project in Tel Aviv already generates enough to cultivate 
20,000 acres of farmland, water that is pure enough for acciden- 
tal drinking." (Vesilind, 1993, pp. 62) 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
With the end of the Cold War, and the predictability of the 
bi-polar power structure, the international community is faced 
with the challenges of constructing new security arrangements in 
the face of security threats that had not heretofore been envi- 
sioned.  Threats from scarcity, maldistribution, and overexploi- 
tation of the world's resources have not been recognized in the 
past, and will require a restructuring of international relations 
policies if they will be properly dealt with in the future. 
According to Thomas Homer-Dixon in "Environmental Change and 
Violent Conflict", the next half century... 
will see a global population approaching nine billion; 
a dramatic decrease in rich adequately irrigated agri- 
cultural land; the loss of much of the remaining virgin 
forests and the abundance of species they sustain; the 
widespread exhaustion and degradation of aquifers, 
rivers, and other water resources; and the collapse of 
many fisheries....In the next decades, environmental 
problems may come to dominate all other factors affect- 
ing the international system. 
Homer-Dixon asserts that there may be links between environmental 
change and conflict; links that must be recognized by the inter- 
national community. 
Regional security, with the focus on environmental change, may 
well be the wave of the future and the only way to deal with the 
types of problems listed above that do not recognize territorial 
boundaries. It will be regional security, with support from the 
international community, mainly in the form of financing, that 
will be required to prevent conflict from occurring in the Middle 
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East over water.  The region has a history of conflict, since the 
end of World War I, the drawing of artificial state boundaries, 
and the inclusion of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.  But the 
region also has a history of trying to resolve its conflicts, at 
least over the issue of water, through participation in a long 
series of water management plans.  The path for regional coopera- 
tion over water has been forged with the Israeli-Jordanian Peace 
Treaty.  Now it remains for the other co-riparians to join in the 
discussions.  As is evident from past conflicts over water, it is 
essential for all riparian states of the river basin to come to 
agreement on property rights and resource allocation, to prevent 
future conflicts.  And, also for issues such as water management 
to be de-linked from the more political, and less easily solvable 
issues, as Palestinian independence. 
Theories that analyze the linkages between water and con- 
flict point to simple resource scarcity and maldistribution as 
the main causes of conflict.  Regional agreements, and the 
intervention of international law can solve the problem of 
maldistribution.  The problems of resource scarcity can be 
handled by understanding the proper role of water as an economic 
resource, and pricing it so as to increase the efficiency of use, 
and also by increasing investment in methods of acquiring new 
water supplies, and conserving existing supplies.  Financial 
backing will be required to build the systems and import the 
technology that is needed in the region as regional actors cannot 
support the costs alone.  Other states from within the region, 
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and sources from the international community must come forward 
with such financing, if conflict in the Jordan River basin region 
is to be avoided. 
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APPENDIX: ANNEX II OF THE 1994 ISRAEL-JORDAN PEACE TREATY 
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty, Israel and Jordan agreed on 
the following Articles on water related matters: 
ARTICLE I: ALLOCATION 
1. Water from the Yarmouk River 
a. Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. 
Israel pumps (12) million cubic meters and Jordan gets the rest 
of the flow. 
b. Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. 
Israel pumps (13) million cubic meters and Jordan is entitled to 
the rest of the flow subject to provisions outlined hereinbelow: 
Jordan concedes to Israel pumping an additional (20) 
million cubic meters from the Yarmouk in winter in 
return for Israel conceding to transferring to Jordan 
during the summer period the quantity specified in 
paragraphs (2.a) below from the Jordan River. 
c. In order that waste of water will be minimized, Israel 
and Jordan may use, downstream of point 121/Adassiya Diversion, 
excess flood water that is not usable and will evidently go to 
waste unused. 
2. Water from the Jordan River 
a. Summer period - 15th May to 15th October of each year. 
In return for the additional water that Jordan concedes to 
Israel in winter in accordance with paragraph (l.b) above, Israel 
concedes to transfer to Jordan in the summer period (20) million 
cubic meters from the Jordan River directly upstream from the 
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Deganya gates on the river. Jordan shall pay the operation and 
maintenance cost of such transfer through existing systems (not 
including capital cost) and shall bear the total cost of any new 
transmission system.  A separate protocol shall regulate this 
transfer. 
b. Winter period - 16th October to 14th May of each year. 
Jordan is entitled to store for its use a minimum average of (20) 
million cubic meters of the floods in the Jordan River south of 
its confluence with the Yarmouk (as outlined in Article II). 
Excess floods that are not usable and that will otherwise be 
wasted can be utilized for the benefit of the two Parties includ- 
ing pumped storage off the course of the river. 
c. In addition to the above, Israel is entitled to maintain 
its current uses of the Jordan River waters between its conflu- 
ence with the Yarmouk and its confluence with Tirat Zvi/Wadi 
Yabis.  Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity equivalent to 
that of Israel, provided however, that Jordan's use will not harm 
the quantity or quality of the above Israeli uses.  The Joint 
Water Committee (outlined in Article IV) will survey existing 
uses for documentation and prevention of appreciable harm. 
d. Jordan is entitled to an annual quantity of (10) million 
cubic meters of desalinated water from the desalination of about 
(20) million cubic meters of saline springs now diverted to the 
Jordan River.  Israel will explore the possibility of financing 
the operation and maintenance cost of the supply to Jordan of 
this desalinated water (not including capital cost).  Until the 
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desalination facilities are operational, and upon the entry into 
force of the Treaty, Israel will supply Jordan (10) million cubic 
meters of Jordan River water from the same location as in (2.a) 
above, outside the summer period and during dates Jordan selects, 
subject to the maximum capacity of transmission. 
3. Additional Water 
a. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate in finding sources for 
the supply to Jordan of an additional quantity of 50 million 
cubic meters per year of water to drinkable standards.  To this 
end, the Joint Water Committee will develop, within one year from 
the entry into force of the Treaty, a plan for the supply to 
Jordan of the above mentioned additional water.  This plan will 
be forwarded to the respective governments for discussion and 
decision. 
4. Operation and Maintenance 
a. Operation and maintenance of the systems on Israeli 
territory that supply Jordan with water, and their electricity 
supply, shall be Israel's responsibility.  The operation and 
maintenance of the new systems that serve only Jordan will be 
contracted at Jordan's expense to authorities or companies 
selected by Jordan. 
b. Israel will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel 
and equipment to such new systems for operation and maintenance. 
This subject will be further detailed in the agreements to be 
signed between Israel and the authorities or companies selected 
by Jordan. 
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ARTICLE II: STORAGE 
1. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a diversion/storage 
dam on the Yarmouk River directly downstream of the point 
121/Adassiya Diversion.  The purpose is to improve the diversion 
efficiency into the King Abdullah Canal of the water allocation 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and possibly for the diver- 
sion of Israel's allocation of the river water.  Other purposes 
can be mutually agreed. 
2. Israel and Jordan shall cooperate to build a system of water 
storage on the Jordan River, along their common boundary, between 
its confluence with the Yarmouk River and its confluence with 
Tirat Zvi/Wadi Yabis, in order to implement the provision of 
paragraph (2.b) of Article I above.  The storage system can also 
be made to accommodate more floods; Israel may use up to (3) 
million cubic meters per year of added storage capacity. 
3. Other storage reservoirs can be discussed and agreed upon 
mutually. 
ARTICLE III: WATER QUALITY AND PROTECTION 
1. Israel and Jordan each undertake to protect, within their own 
jurisdiction, the shared waters of the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers, 
and Arava/Araba groundwater, against any pollution, contamina- 
tion, harm or unauthorized withdrawals of each other's alloca- 
tions . 
2. For this purpose, Israel and Jordan will jointly monitor the 
quality of water along their boundary, by use of jointly estab- 
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lished monitoring stations to be operated under the guidance of 
the Joint Water Committee. 
3. Israel and Jordan will each prohibit the disposal of municipal 
and industrial wastewater into the course of the Yarmouk or the 
Jordan Rivers before they are treated to standards allowing their 
unrestricted agricultural use.  Implementation of this prohibi- 
tion shall be completed within three years from the entry into 
force of the Treaty. 
4. The quality of water supplied from one country to the other at 
any given location shall be equivalent to the quality of the 
water used from the same location by the supplying'country. 
5. Saline springs currently diverted to the Jordan River are 
earmarked for desalination within four years.  Both countries 
shall cooperate to ensure that the resulting brine will not be 
disposed of in the Jordan River or in any of its tributaries. 
6. Israel and Jordan will each protect water systems in its own 
territory, supplying water to the other, against any pollution, 
contamination, harm or unauthorized withdrawal of each other's 
allocations. 
ARTICLE IV: GROUNDWATER IN EMEK HA'ARAVA/WADI ARABA 
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, some wells 
drilled and used by Israel along with their associated systems 
fall on the Jordanian side of the borders.  These wells and 
systems are under Jordan's sovereignty.  Israel shall retain the 
use of these wells and systems in the quantity and quality 
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detailed in Appendix 1 that shall be jointly prepared by 31st 
December 1994.  Neither country shall take, nor cause to be 
taken, any measure that may appreciably reduce the yields of 
quality of these wells and systems. 
2. Throughout the period of Israel's use of these wells and 
systems, replacement of any well that may fail among them shall 
be licensed by Jordan in accordance with the laws and regulations 
then in effect.  For this purpose, the failed well shall be 
treated as though it was drilled under license from the competent 
Jordanian authority at the time of its drilling.  Israel shall 
supply Jordan with the log of each of the wells and the technical 
information about it to be kept on record.  The replacement well 
shall be connected to the Israeli electricity and water systems. 
3. Israel may increase the abstraction rate from wells and 
systems in Jordan by up to 10 million cubic meters per year above 
the yields referred to in paragraph 1 above, subject to a deter- 
mination by the Joint Water Committee that this undertaking is 
hydrogeologically feasible and does not harm existing Jordanian 
uses.  Such increase is to be carried out within five years from 
the entry into force of the Treaty. 
4. Operation and Maintenance 
a. Operation and Maintenance of the wells and systems on 
Jordanian territory that supply Israel with water, and their 
electricity supply shall be Jordan's responsibility.  The opera- 
tion and maintenance of these wells and systems will be contract 
ed at Israel's expense to authorities or companies selected by 
Israel. 
b. Jordan will guarantee easy unhindered access of personnel 
and equipment to such wells and systems for operation and mainte- 
nance.  This subject will be further detailed in the agreements 
to be signed between Jordan and the authorities or companies 
selected by Israel. 
ARTICLE V: NOTIFICATION AND AGREEMENT 
1. Artificial changes in or of the course of the Jordan and 
Yarmouk Rivers can only be make by mutual agreement. 
2. Each country undertakes to notify the other, six months ahead 
of time, of any intended projects which are likely to change the 
flow of either of the above rivers along their common boundary, 
or the quality of such flow.  The subject will be discussed in 
the Joint Water Committee with the aim of preventing harm and 
mitigating adverse impacts such projects may cause. 
ARTICLE VI: CO-OPERATION 
1. Israel and Jordan undertake to exchange relevant data on water 
resources through the Joint Water Committee. 
2. Israel and Jordan shall co-operate in developing plans for 
purposes of increasing water supplies and improving water use 
efficiency, within the context of bilateral, regional or interna- 
tional co-operation. 
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ARTICLE VII: JOINT WATER COMMITTEE 
1. For the purpose of the implementation of this Annex, the 
Parties will establish a Joint Water Committee comprised of three 
members from each country. 
2. The Joint Water Committee will, with the approval of the 
respective governments, specify its work procedures, the frequen- 
cy of its meetings, and the details of its scope of work.  The 
Committee may invite experts and/or advisors as may be required. 
3. The Committee may form, as it deems necessary, a number of 
specialized sub-committees and assign them technical tasks.  In 
this context, it is agreed that these sub-committees will include 
a northern sub-committee and a southern sub-committee, for the 
management on the ground of the mutual water resources in these 
sectors. 
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